Clifford Chance

Recent weeks have seen a flurry of activity by the Serious Fraud Office ("SFO"), with two key developments suggesting it is taking a more proactive approach to enforcement of the UK's anti-corruption laws. The agency has initiated a corporate prosecution for failing to prevent bribery and has announced a new investigation concerning alleged overseas corruption.

What do these cases indicate about how the SFO is putting its enforcement approach into practice?

The new cases

Prosecution of United Insurance Brokers Limited ("UIBL")

As noted in our separate RIFC Insights blog post, the SFO has charged United Insurance Brokers Limited ("UIBL") with the corporate offence of failing to prevent bribery under section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010. Proceedings got underway at a brief hearing at Westminster Magistrates' Court on 7 May. UIBL has not yet indicated a plea and the next hearing is due to take place at Southwark Crown Court on 4 June.

The proceedings concern allegations that bribes of approximately USD 3 million were paid by US-based intermediaries retained by UIBL to state officials in Ecuador between October 2013 and March 2016 in order to secure reinsurance contracts worth USD 38 million.

Investigation concerning Blu-3 Limited ("Blu-3")

In a separate investigation announced several weeks later, the SFO is looking into the circumstances surrounding payments totalling approximately £3 million made by individuals associated with Blu-3 in connection with the construction of a data centre in the Netherlands. The investigation was announced on 30 April 2025 following the SFO's dawn raid of five properties across London, Kent, Surrey and Somerset, during which three arrests were made.

Commentary: Pragmatism and Proactivity?

During his tenure to date, the public pronouncements of the SFO's Director Nick Ephgrave have often suggested that after a period of relative inactivity, the SFO's enforcement focus would be on pursuing UK-centric fraud. For example, in May 2024, giving evidence to UK legislators, he confirmed that he was actively on the lookout for the first corporate entity to prosecute using the new corporate offence of failing to prevent fraud ("the Corporate Fraud Offence") (even though at that stage it was still six months until the implementation date would be known). He has since regularly publicly re-stated his commitment to promptly prosecuting this offence.

However, the prosecution of UIBL and the commencement of an investigation into Blu-3 indicate that the SFO has more than just ECCTA on its mind. These steps may be seen as a manifestation of its stated intention in its recently released Business Plan to act as a "proactive, authoritative player in the global and domestic justice system".

It is apparent that the SFO does not intend to choose between tackling UK-centric and international cases, or between taking cases which may come to it through engagement with corporate organisations and those which are initiated via other routes. 

The SFO's recently announced Corporate Co-operation Guidance contains some of the clearest indications to emerge from the SFO to date about the potential benefits of early and full co-operation through self-reporting, and what corporate organisations should do in order to avail themselves of the advantages of early resolution through deferred prosecution agreements. For full details, see our separate RIFC Insights blog post.

However, just as they reiterate that the SFO's remit covers more than domestically centred fraud, the commencement of its latest investigation and prosecution and investigation underline that the SFO is, first and foremost, a criminal investigation and prosecution agency, and that it will not only deal in negotiated settlements.

The significance of the prosecution of UIBL and the commencement of the investigation concerning Blu-3 is likely to lie in their demonstration of how the SFO is putting its proposed approach into action rather than the magnitude of any outcomes which may follow. Specific areas to watch will include:

1. The meaning of "adequate procedures" for the purposes of the corporate offence of failing to prevent bribery – As we noted in our separate RIFC Insights blog post, the prosecution of UIBL could bring some further clarity to the question of what will provide corporate organisations with a defence to the offence of failing to prevent bribery.
2. The extent to which new routes to corporate criminal liability are used – Details have not yet been released about the duration and timing of the alleged wrongdoing with which the Blu-3 investigation is concerned and the SFO has not confirmed if it is considering whether corporate prosecutions may be appropriate. However, if this alleged conduct occurred after 26 December 2023, the case could provide an early guide to the circumstances in which corporate organisations may be held criminally liable for the acts of their "senior managers". For further details on these provisions, see the sections of our Clifford Chance briefing dealing with the expansion of the identification doctrine.
3. How, and how effectively, the SFO interacts internationally – Given the locations in which conduct is alleged to have occurred, both cases are likely to require significant levels of collaboration between the SFO and overseas counterparts. One area of particular interest will be whether the US "enforcement pause" on FCPA matters has any impact on the extent to which or the way in which any necessary assistance is provided. 
4. Whether increases in the use of technology lead to the acceleration of proceedings or charging decisions – The SFO has already pointed to the adoption of TAR as a contributor to some efficiency improvements. These cases will provide early indications of whether these streamlined arrangements alleviate any of the disclosure difficulties it has historically experienced and/or assist with concluding proceedings more quickly than has previously been possible.