30 May 2019
The authors* Nelson Jung and Elizabeth Sinclair reflect on whether challenges of the digital economy are prompting competition authorities to develop speculative theories of harm involving "innovation competition" as a basis for intervention in merger situations, despite lacking other economic evidence of competition concerns. They also discuss the perceived merger control enforcement gap in digital markets, the application of innovation theories of harm, and whether the existing regime is adequate.
This article was first published by Thomson Reuters, trading as Sweet & Maxwell, 5 Canada Square, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5AQ in the European Competition Law Review as Innovation theories of harm in merger control: plugging a perceived enforcement gap in anticipation of more far-reaching reforms? [E.C.L.R. 2019, 40(6), 266-275] and is reproduced by agreement with the publishers.
*Nelson Jung is an antitrust partner at Clifford Chance and Elizabeth Sinclair, formerly a senior associate at Clifford Chance, is Assistant Director at the Competition and Markets Authority.
ECLR article on Innovation theories of harm in merger control