On 28 July 2026, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) refused leave to appeal in R v Osmond [2026] EWCA Crim 979, the first publicised case in which an individual convicted of tipping off has sought to challenge that conviction.

Facts and decision

The case arose from a Serious Fraud Office (SFO) money laundering investigation into a Mayfair property transaction. It came to the SFO's attention during its wider and well-publicised investigation into Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC). William Osmond, a solicitor who acted for a client connected to the transaction, was convicted of tipping off under section 333A(3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) – the offence applicable to individuals within businesses which carry on business in the regulated sector for the purposes of UK anti-money laundering (AML) legislation. He did so by disclosing details of the SFO's enquiries to that client. He was also convicted of forgery in relation to a backdated engagement letter provided to the SFO in connection with the property transaction.

On appeal, Mr Osmond argued that the relevant investigation formed part of the broader ENRC investigation, which was already public knowledge, and that the information disclosed had not been received in the course of business in the regulated sector. The Court of Appeal rejected those arguments, upheld the conviction and provided important appellate guidance on several key elements of the tipping off offence.

Five key takeaways from the Court of Appeal's judgment

1. A "tipping off" disclosure can relate to a specific aspect of a wider investigation

The Court confirmed that a disclosure can amount to tipping off even where it concerns "an aspect of (or a strand within)" a wider investigation that is already publicly known (paras 46–48). The relevant disclosure was not the existence of the broader ENRC investigation, but the fact that the SFO was specifically investigating the Mayfair property transaction.

For regulated firms, the decision is a reminder that information received from law enforcement may remain highly sensitive even where the underlying investigation has attracted significant publicity.

2. "Regulated sector" takes a broad meaning

The Court clarified the scope of the requirement that information be received "in the course of a business in the regulated sector" (paras 50–52). The relevant question is not the source of the information, but the capacity in which it is received.

Mr Osmond received the information in his professional capacity while acting in connection with a real estate transaction. This was enough to satisfy the requirement that the information came to him in the course of business in the regulated sector. The point does not only apply to legal professionals such as Mr Osmond; it is equally relevant to financial institutions and other businesses falling within the ambit of UK AML regulation responding to law enforcement enquiries.

3. Actual prejudice does not need to be proved

The Court confirmed that the statutory test for tipping off is whether the disclosure was likely to prejudice the investigation at the time it was made (paras 11 and 56). It is not necessary for actual prejudice to occur.

The Court went further, observing that disclosure of an investigation to its target is inherently capable of prejudicing that investigation because of the risk that evidence may be destroyed or compromised, or that suspects may seek to evade justice.

4. Forgery encompasses a wide range of situations

The Court also upheld the forgery conviction (paras 53–54). The defence accepted that the engagement letter had been backdated to create the impression that Mr Osmond had been formally retained at an earlier date, but argued that the forgery offence was not made out because the SFO investigator who received it had not done so in connection with the performance of any duty. The argument was that, although the SFO had statutory powers to investigate and compel the provision of documents and information, it was under no statutory duty to do so. The Court rejected that technical distinction, holding that, once the SFO has commenced an investigation, those conducting it are carrying out a public function and acting in the performance of duties owed both to the SFO and to the public.

5. Criticisms of the wider ENRC investigation did not assist the defence

The appellant relied heavily on findings made against the SFO in the ENRC litigation. The Court rejected those arguments, emphasising that criticisms concerning the origins of the wider ENRC investigation had no bearing on whether Osmond had committed the offences charged.

One point not covered in this case

The case concerned individual criminal liability. However, section 333A POCA offences are among the offences capable of being attributed to corporates under the UK's expanded attribution regime, having previously fallen within section 196 of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 and now section 250 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 (see blog here). While the point did not arise directly in Osmond, the judgment nevertheless serves as a reminder that, at least in principle, a tipping off offence committed by a senior individual within a regulated firm could expose the firm itself to criminal liability.