An overview of the Chinese merger control review regime under the 2007 Anti-monopoly Law and its implementation rules. It discusses the types of transactions subject to notification, consequences of failure to notify, timing of the review, potential clearance remedies, and required submission details. The note has a flow chart to show the indicative timeline of the merger control process and also a table to summarise the milestone dates of the regulator’s published decisions.

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SCOPE OF THIS NOTE

The Anti-monopoly Law 2007 (2007 AML) is the top-tier legislation governing China’s merger control regime. Since the adoption of this principal law, China’s merger control regulator (previously the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and then the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) after the 2018 government institutional reform) has quickly established itself as one of the major merger control enforcement agencies in the world. The regulator has reviewed more than 2500 transactions and has cleared the vast majority of them, imposing remedies in 41 cases and prohibiting only two transactions to date.

This note explains the current practices and procedures that have developed under the 2007 AML, the accompanying Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for Declaring Concentration of Business Operators 2008 (2008 Provisions of the State Council), as well as a variety of other guidelines and rules issued by the regulator to inform the merger control process.

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MERGER NOTIFICATION AND REVIEW: OVERVIEW

Under the 2007 AML and 2008 Provisions of the State Council, a concentration must be notified to the regulator if certain thresholds are triggered.

Failure to notify can result in a fine of up to RMB500,000 and an order to unwind the transaction. Damage to a company’s reputation with the regulator should also be taken into account. Since 1 May 2014, the regulator has started to publicly announce its decisions on penalising parties who failed to notify their transactions.

A clearance decision on the transaction can be obtained within an initial period of 30 calendar days. The regulator has a non-binding target 30-day review period for qualifying simple cases. However, the clock only starts to run from the time that the regulator declares the notification complete.

In practice, however, the time taken between notification and the start of the formal review procedure is unpredictable. This can take several weeks or span several months. The actual time taken for the notification to be declared complete can vary depending on the complexity of the case, the parties’ responsiveness to the regulator’s information requests and the regulator’s internal priorities. Therefore, this timing should be carefully factored into deal timelines.

To reduce the likelihood of the notification filing being declared incomplete, it is advisable to supply as much of the data specified by the regulator as possible. Pre-consultation discussions may assist in scoping the amount of data ultimately provided to the regulator in the notification.

Similarly, the actual time taken to obtain a clearance decision can be a lot longer than the stated 30 days in complex cases. The initial 30-day period can be extended by up to 90 calendar days, which in turn can be extended by a further 60 calendar days. An important time and cost factor is that the regulator requires key documents to be translated into Chinese or at least accompanied with a Chinese summary.

In practice, engaging early with the regulator, understanding its internal procedures and responsiveness to its identified concerns serve to facilitate the review process.

THE SINGLE ANTI-TRUST REGULATOR REFORM

The 2018 government institutional reform mandates an on-going project to consolidate the enforcement powers of China’s anti-trust regulators into the SAMR. The consolidation is one of the significant changes in China’s anti-trust enforcement since the 2007 AML came into force in 2008.

Before the reform, the anti-trust enforcement powers were split among:

• The Anti-Monopoly Bureau of MOFCOM, with powers including supervising concentrations of undertakings (that is, merger reviews).

• The Price Supervision and Inspection and Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), with jurisdiction over price-related anti-competitive conduct.

• The Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Bureau of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), with jurisdiction over non-price related anti-competitive conduct. The SAIC was disbanded in 2018 with powers vested into its successor agency, the SAMR.

Each agency was given complete autonomy over its respective area of enforcement, under the co-ordination of the Anti-Monopoly Commission (AMC) of the State Council.

While the State Council AMC has been retained and remains independent from the SAMR, the anti-trust teams of MOFCOM, the NDRC and the SAIC have been consolidated into the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the SAMR to eliminate the overlapping of investigatory powers.

With all anti-trust matters regulated by a single agency, the SAMR could have more flexibility in allocating staffing based on changes in the flow of matters and the agency’s policy direction. The integration should also enable greater knowledge and information exchange among staff working on various anti-trust matters. This may further improve the efficiency and quality of the regulator’s handling of complex anti-trust matters. Businesses can also expect to receive unified guidance about how the enforcer will implement the 2007 AML in investigations and should have greater clarity as to how to carry out their compliance efforts.

Following the anti-trust enforcement merger, three out of the 11 divisions under the new Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the SAMR are tasked with merger review functions, staffed with the former MOFCOM, NDRC and SAIC case handlers. The SAMR is observed to inherit the merger control implementing rules from MOFCOM and mostly follow the precedents set prior to the consolidation. For example, on 29 September 2018, the SAMR amended
the following implementing rules from MOFCOM (mainly to reflect the name change of the anti-trust authority in China following the consolidation of the anti-trust enforcement agencies):


Apart from the above, on 29 September 2018, the SAMR released an updated **Merger Notification Form** (2018 Notification Form), replacing its predecessor form that was in effect since 2012.

For more information on the anti-trust enforcement merger, see Practice note, Understanding the 2018 government institutional reform: China: Single anti-trust regulator.

**WHICH TRANSACTIONS ARE NOTIFIABLE?**

An obligation to submit an anti-trust notification is triggered in China where the transaction is deemed to be a concentration and the turnover threshold is met. These are often referred to as the merger notification “twin tests”. Both acquisitions by foreign investors and domestic companies, including state-owned enterprises and private companies, must be notified if the twin tests are met.

**Concentration**

Concentrations include the following:

- Mergers between undertakings.
- Acquiring control of other undertakings through the acquisition of shares or assets.
- Acquiring control of other undertakings, or the ability to exercise decisive influence over other undertakings, by contract or other means.  
  
  **(Article 20, 2007 AML)**

An undertaking is defined as a natural person, legal person or other organisation that produces or sells products, or provides services **(Article 12, 2007 AML)**.

**Concept of control**

Control or decisive influence is not expressly defined under the 2007 AML but is further clarified in the **2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions**. The 2014 opinions suggest a decisive influence test, based on a number of legal and factual factors. Transaction documents and the articles of association of the target undertakings are important documents for this control test, but will not be considered as the only basis for determining control. Other factors that should be taken into account include:

- The purpose of the transaction and future business plans.
- The shareholding structure of the target and the changes to that structure.
- Reserved matters and voting mechanism of the shareholders’ meeting of the target and its historical attendance rate and voting record.
- The composition and voting mechanism of the board of directors and board of supervisors of the target.
- The appointment and dismissal of senior management of the target.
- The relationship between the shareholders and directors of the target, including whether there is any proxy voting arrangement or person acting in concert.
- The existence of any material business relationship or co-operation agreement between the acquirer and the target.
  
  **(Article 3.)**

In line with the practice in most other jurisdictions, the 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions draw a distinction between sole control and joint control **(Article 3)**. In a previous draft of the opinions circulated internally for comments, the regulator tried to distinguish between positive and negative control (that is, the right to block...
key decisions). Despite the fact that this distinction has been removed in the current version, there is no doubt that negative control will also be caught in the law enforcement of the regulator.

Joint ventures

The creation of a joint venture by two or more undertakings is not expressly mentioned as a type of concentration under the 2007 AML.

The regulator ended the debate on whether the 2007 AML applies to joint ventures with its conditional clearance decisions related to the establishment of the following:

- The GE/Shenhua joint venture.
- The Henkel/Tiande joint venture.
- The ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/Gemalto joint venture.
- The Maersk/MSC/CMA CGM alliance.
- The Corun/Toyota China/PEVE/Xin Zhong Yuan/Toyota Tsusho joint venture (most recent).

There are other indicia that point to a joint venture being a notifiable concentration, for example:

- The regulator’s designated notification form requires notifying parties to specify whether the transaction concerns the establishment of a joint venture and, if yes, to provide information on the joint venture and its parent companies.
- The 2009 Guiding Opinions on Documents for Concentration of Business Operators state that parties wishing to notify transactions must describe the transaction concerned, including whether it involves establishing a joint venture.
- Article 4 of the 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions provides that any newly-established joint venture under the joint control of at least two undertakings constitutes a concentration of undertakings.

Unlike in the EU, a joint venture does not need to be fully functional to be notifiable in China. The 2007 AML and its implementation rules do not specify any types of joint venture that do not require notification. A set of draft rules published by MOFCOM for public comment in January 2009 identified joint ventures that do not require notification, including any:

- Special purpose vehicle.
- Joint venture that is not independent of its parents or does not operate on a lasting basis.
- Joint venture that performs only specific functions for its parents such as production, sales or research and development.

These notification carve-outs were deleted when the final version was enacted (that is, the Measures for the Declaration of Concentration of Business Operators 2009 (2009 Concentration of Business Measures)). Therefore, any type of joint venture is notifiable if it constitutes a concentration and meets the turnover thresholds.

In addition, there is no express requirement under the 2007 AML or its implementation rules for a joint venture to be incorporated as a certain type of legal entity to constitute a notifiable concentration. The 2007 AML provides that a concentration may arise through contract although it does not indicate the specific circumstances in which this can occur. The fact that activities are organised contractually is not, in itself, an obstacle to creating a joint venture, provided they bring about a structural change to the activities of its parents on the relevant markets in the same way as an incorporated legal entity.

In Maersk/MSC/CMA CGM the proposed P3 alliance (a long-term operational vessel sharing agreement on the East–West trades) was structured as a limited liability partnership. In its decision, the regulator identified the P3 alliance as a tight joint operation as the parties would integrate all their capacity by establishing a network centre. (For more information, see Legal update, MOFCOM prohibits P3 Network shipping alliance between Maersk Line, Mediterranean Shipping Company and CMA-CGM.)

In rejecting the P3 alliance, the regulator set a precedent to guide undertakings on what types of alliance arrangements must be filed to the regulator for a merger review. In practice, the establishment of a closely bonded joint operation on a contractual basis can amount to a concentration under the 2007 AML depending on the circumstances of the case. The key issue when assessing the notifiability of a joint venture created by a contract is whether the joint venture would operate as if a fully-fledged, incorporated joint venture, that is, whether the joint venture has its own management and the necessary resources (including finances, assets and staff) to perform as an autonomous economic entity on the market.
Acquisition of minority interests

The acquisition of a minority interest in an undertaking can constitute a concentration requiring notification to the regulator, if the minority interest is significant and is accompanied by other rights that together enable the acquirer to control or to exercise decisive influence over the target.

There is no safe harbour level of interest that does not trigger a notification. The assessment of control or decisive influence requires a case-by-case analysis, assessing the nature of:

• Veto rights.
• Negative control rights.
• Any special rights that the minority shareholder can have in relation to the target.

(See Concept of control.)

Rights that typically confer control or decisive influence include veto rights or negative controlling rights relating to the strategic affairs of the target (such as the budget or business plan). In the China context, the regulator may in practice find that control or decisive influence can arise where the rights conferred on the minority shareholder relate to major commercial or financial matters that fall short of strategic affairs, depending on the specific circumstances of the case.

Conversely, control or decisive influence can be excluded if the minority shareholder’s rights only amount to minority protection rights. In practice, minority shareholders’ veto rights to the following matters generally can be regarded as minority protection rights:

• Amendment to the articles of association.
• Mergers and de-mergers.
• Capital increases or decreases.
• Liquidation or winding-up of a company.

Exceptions: not a notifiable concentration

A notification is not required if either:

• An undertaking involved in the concentration holds 50% or more of the voting shares or assets of each of the other undertakings involved in the concentration.
• An undertaking not involved in the concentration holds 50% or more of the voting shares or assets of each of the undertakings involved in the concentration.

(Article 22, 2007 AML.)

The provision is designed to exempt internal group restructurings between affiliates where the 50% rule applies.

Turnover thresholds

The turnover threshold is met when in the last financial year either:

• The aggregate global turnover of all the undertakings to the concentration exceeds RMB10 billion and each of at least two of the undertakings to the concentration has a Chinese turnover of at least RMB400 million.
• The aggregate Chinese turnover of all the undertakings to the concentration exceeds RMB2 billion and each of at least two of the undertakings to the concentration has a Chinese turnover of at least RMB400 million.


It is important to note that the regulator may investigate a concentration (even if the thresholds are not met) if the concentration has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition in China (Article 4, 2008 Provisions of the State Council). It remains unclear under what circumstances the regulator may exercise this power, although it has been reported that the regulator investigated at least two such concentrations to date (Didi/Uber and Dreamworks/Comcast). It is likely that this might only happen in exceptional circumstances, in essence, if significant concerns arise. The regulator is currently considering guidelines in this regard.

Calculating turnover of undertakings

The turnover thresholds are designed to establish jurisdiction and not to assess the relative market position of the parties involved in a concentration or the impact of the transaction on the relevant market.
Turnover includes revenues generated from selling products or providing services related to, and the resources attributable to, all areas of the business activities of the merging parties. The regulator will normally rely on a party’s audited accounts for the financial year closest to the date of the transaction. (Article 5, 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions.)

Articles 4-6 of the 2009 Concentration of Business Measures and Articles 5-7 of the 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions provide certain, but only limited, guidance on the calculation of turnover including:

• Chinese turnover is determined by reference to the location of the customer, and is understood to exclude turnover generated in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.

• Turnover excludes certain taxes and surcharges, but the rules do not specify the relevant deductible taxes and surcharges.

• The turnover of each of the undertakings to the transaction should be assessed based on all revenues at group level, but excluding intragroup sales.

• For the purpose of turnover calculation for joint ventures, turnover includes that generated from sales between the joint venture and third parties, which is only counted once. In contrast, the turnover generated from sales between the joint venture and its parents is not counted, as this will be regarded as intra-group sales.

• If any undertaking involved in the concentration is under the joint control of two or more controlling parties (that are not directly involved in the concentration), its turnover will include the turnover of all the controlling parties.

Specifically, these rules provide that the turnover of an individual undertaking party to a concentration includes the total turnover of the following undertakings:

• The individual undertaking.

• Other undertakings directly or indirectly controlled by the undertaking above.

• Other undertakings that directly or indirectly control the undertaking in the first bullet above.

• Other undertakings directly or indirectly controlled by the undertakings under the third bullet above.

• Other undertakings jointly controlled by two or more undertakings under any of the above.

The turnover of an individual undertaking party to the concentration should not include the turnover generated between the undertakings listed above (Article 6, 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions).

If only part of a business or an entity is being acquired, only turnover attributable to that sold business or entity is taken into account (Article 7, 2009 Concentration of Business Measures). Article 7 of the 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions further clarifies that if the seller no longer has any control over the target (either in the form of assets or legal entities whose equity is being transferred), only the turnover of the target will be counted. In other words, the seller’s turnover not attributable to the sold business is not counted in this circumstance.

Concentrations between the same parties within a two-year period that do not separately trigger the turnover thresholds are treated as one transaction. The timing of when the concentration occurs will be the time of occurrence of the last concentration and the turnover of the concentrations is aggregated for the purpose of the turnover calculation (Article 7, 2009 Concentration of Business Measures and Article 8, 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions).

Special rules apply to the calculation of the turnover of undertakings in the financial sector such as in banking, insurance, securities and futures (Article 5, 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions).

Determining parties to concentration for calculating turnover

The parties to the concentration for the purpose of calculating turnover include the merging parties, and in the case of an acquisition, the parties that will acquire control or exercise decisive influence and the target.

In the case of a greenfield joint venture, the parties to the concentration are the parties that will control or exercise decisive influence over the joint venture. Where the joint venture is established from an existing company, the question will turn on whether the existing company is itself a joint venture or which of the parties will control or have the ability to exercise decisive influence post-transaction. If the seller of the existing company sells but retains a controlling stake in the acquired business, the turnover of the seller would be taken into account in determining whether the turnover thresholds are met.
WHEN TO MAKE A NOTIFICATION

A concentration must be notified to the regulator before the transaction is completed and after conclusion of the transaction documents (Article 14, 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions). The regulator encourages parties to notify transactions as early as possible.

Generally, the regulator will accept a notification only after the conclusion of a definitive and binding agreement. The regulator may also accept a notification even if not based on definitive, binding transaction documents. The notification form notes that the regulator may review a notification filed on the basis of, for example, a framework agreement, memorandum of understanding or letter of intent. However, parties must explain why the notification is made based on non-definitive agreements. This leaves the regulator with considerable discretion. The regulator is more likely to accept a notification if the agreement is sufficiently detailed and binding.

From time to time, staggered transactions occur and the question arises as to when the transaction should be notified to the regulator. There are no hard and fast rules regarding this. The guiding principles for determining the timing of notification include the stage at which the purchaser acquires control or decisive influence of the target business or entity, and when the parties intend to complete the transaction. Given the prospect of delays in the process, it may prove useful to notify a staggered transaction early in the process (see How long does it take to obtain clearance?).

WHAT HAPPENS IF A NOTIFIABLE TRANSACTION IS NOT NOTIFIED?

The merging parties have an obligation to file a notification with the regulator. In other cases, the parties gaining control or decisive influence bear responsibility for the notification. (Article 13, 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions.)

If parties fail to notify a transaction, or parties close a transaction before the regulator approves it, the regulator can:

- Order the parties to unwind the transaction.
- Impose a fine of up to RMB500,000.
- Impose any measures it deems appropriate to restore the pre-transaction market conditions (for example, dispose of the shares or assets in question, or transfer the concerned business within a specified time limit).

(Article 48, 2007 AML)

Parties should also consider the possible impact on their future relationship with the regulator, as the SAMR is the super agency in market supervision. (For more information, see Practice note, Understanding the 2018 government institutional reform: China: Market supervision: a mega-sized regulator.)

As of 25 July 2019, the regulator has issued 37 penalty decisions on failure to notify. To date, the regulator has not sought to unwind any transactions on the basis that they were not notified.

Since 1 May 2014, the regulator began to publicly announce its decisions on penalising parties who failed to notify their transactions. Fines of RMB150,000 to RMB400,000 were imposed in these cases with receivers including both Chinese and foreign companies.

The publicised decisions from the regulator were notable in certain respects. The decisions provided further guidance on the point of implementation of a concentration where the relevant parties would be considered to have failed to notify the concentration. For example:

- For a concentration through acquisition, the parties should have notified before the completion of the registration of the share transfer at the competent registration authority.
- Concerning a concentration through joint venture, the point of implementation was when the joint venture obtained the business licence.
- For a concentration to be implemented in several steps, depending on the links between the steps, the regulator may expect the parties to notify the concentration prior to the first step.
- Companies received heavier fines where they deliberately decided not to notify or where they had been previously fined for not notifying.

HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE TO OBTAIN CLEARANCE?

Before the parties can implement the transaction, they must obtain clearance from the regulator or the review period must expire without objection or request for further information (Article 25, 2007 AML).
The clearance process consists of two stages, the pre-consultation phase and the review phase. There is no statutory deadline for the pre-consultation phase. However, under statute, the regulator has a total of 180 calendar days for its review phase.

Pre-consultation phase

For complex cases, it is possible (and advisable) to make an informal pre-filing consultation with the regulator to discuss major issues. This can be done by way of a meeting with the regulator. A pre-consultation meeting is not a mandatory process, rather, the notifying parties can decide at their own discretion whether to apply for a pre-consultation meeting with the regulator (Article 9, 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions).

Parties who apply for a meeting should submit in writing, either by fax or by courier, an application letter to the regulator. The application letter should set out the following:

- A basic introduction of the transaction and the parties.
- The questions proposed to consult with the regulator.
- The attendees and their respective nationality, employer and title.
- The proposed timing and contact person.

(Article 10, 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions.)

Pre-consultation meetings are only granted on the basis of a genuine and relatively definite transaction, and the questions to be discussed must be directly related to the corresponding transaction, and may include:

- Whether the transaction is notifiable (both from the perspective of the control test and the turnover test).
- Notification documents, and required information and materials (including what type of information must be submitted, in what form and to what level of detail).
- Factual and legal questions such as market definition and whether the simplified procedure can apply.
- Procedural questions including the timing of notification, notifying parties, time period of review, simplified procedure and other matters related to the notification and review procedure.
- Other relevant questions such as whether there is any potential failure to file issue.

(Article 11, 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions.)

On receipt of the application, the regulator (based on the case status and the proposed questions) will decide whether to convene the pre-consultation meeting (Article 12, 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions). In practice, the regulator is of the view that the result of a pre-consultation meeting is not legally binding.

A formal merger notification usually follows within several days or weeks of the pre-consultation meeting. The regulator then reviews the notification and accompanying annexes to determine whether additional information or clarifications are required before the clock for the formal review phase starts. The regulator will usually ask questions and require the submission of additional information before the formal review phase starts.

Formal review phase

The formal review phase only starts once the regulator declares the notification complete and initiates the formal review process (Article 16, 2014 Business Operators Guiding Opinions).

The regulator will usually confirm that it is initiating the formal review process in writing, but may confirm verbally to counsel acting for the notifying party with written confirmation to follow.

In practice, the period between the parties’ merger notification and the start of the formal review procedure is unpredictable. This can take several weeks or span several months depending on:

- The complexity of the transaction.
- The parties’ responsiveness to the regulator’s information requests.
- The regulator’s internal priorities.

The initial review phase is 30 calendar days and starts from the day following the date on which the regulator declares the notification complete. On expiry of the 30-day period, unless the regulator has notified the parties otherwise or made a request for further information, the transaction is deemed to be cleared and can be implemented. (Article 25, 2007 AML.)
The regulator may initiate an in-depth “phase II” investigation for another 90 calendar days if it considers the transaction has, or may have, the effect of eliminating or restricting competition (Article 26, 2007 AML). In practice, the regulator may also launch this phase II investigation if it is unable to complete its market investigation during the initial review period. The phase II period can be extended for a further 60 calendar days in limited circumstances or with the parties’ consent (Article 26, 2007 AML).

It is also possible that the notification may need to be withdrawn and re-filed if there are considerable delays in the review process and the regulator is unlikely to be able to complete its review within the statutory review period. For example, in 16 conditionally approved transactions (namely, Western Digital/HGST, Glencore/Xstrata, Marubeni/ Caviion, MediaTek/Mstar, NXP/Freescale, Dow/Du Pont, HP/Samsung, Agrium/PotashCorp, Maersk/Hamburg Süd, Advanced Semiconductor/Siliconware Precision, Bayer/Monsanto, Essilor/Luxottica, Linde/Praxair, UTC/Rockwell Collins, KLA-Tencor/Orbotech and Cargotec/TTS), the parties withdrew and re-filed their transactions and as a result, the review process of these transactions took more than 180 calendar days from the date on which the notification was declared complete. In six of the above cases (namely, Glencore/Xstrata, MediaTek/Mstar, Dow/Du Pont, Bayer/Monsanto, Essilor/Luxottica and Linde/Praxair), the total review period exceeded 12 months. (For more information, see Annex 2: Regulator’s published decisions.)

The actual time taken to obtain clearance is unpredictable and depends on the complexity of the case from the regulator’s perspective. In difficult cases, repeated requests for further information, vocal complainants and negative media comments about the transaction can be expected to delay the clearance process.

Simplified procedure

Since 2014, the regulator has allowed a fast-track anti-trust review for simple cases that meet the following criteria:

• Where the merging parties compete, the combined market share of all parties to the concentration is less than 15%.

• Where the merging parties operate in vertically related markets, market shares are less than 25% in both the upstream and downstream markets.

• Where the merging parties do not compete or operate in vertically related markets, the market shares are less than 25% in relation to each market relevant to the merger.

• Joint ventures established outside of China that do not engage in economic activities in China.

• Acquisitions of foreign entities that do not engage in economic activities in China.

• Where joint ventures, which are jointly controlled by two or more parties, become controlled by one or more parties.


Further, there are six situations where the fast-track review does not apply:

• Where a joint venture that is jointly controlled by two or more parties becomes controlled by one of those parties through the concentration (provided that the party and the joint venture are competitors).

• Where it is difficult to define the relevant markets affected by the concentration.

• Where the concentration could have a detrimental impact on market access or technological progress.

• Where the concentration could have a detrimental impact on consumers and relevant undertakings.

• Where the concentration of undertakings could have a detrimental impact on national economic development.

• Other situations in which the regulator believes that the concentration may have a detrimental impact on market competition.

(Article 3, 2014 Interim Simple Mergers Regulations.)

If, on review, the regulator is of the view that the transaction meets the criteria for simple cases, a simplified notification form is available and the regulator will post the related public announcement form on its website for a ten-day period (Article 8, 2014 Guiding Opinions on Simple Case Declaration).

Although the regulator has not given any formal guidance as to the duration of the review of simple mergers, it has a target 30-calendar-day initial review period for qualifying cases. To date, the simplified procedure has worked well in practice. The large majority of the simple cases were cleared in this initial review phase.
CLEARANCE PROCEDURE

The 2007 AML requires that the regulator assess whether a notified transaction has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition in China. The regulator should, in the course of the review, determine whether the concentration will result in, among other things, high market shares, significant concentration levels, or harm to effective competition or consumer interests in China.

Clearance process

There is no published guidance on how the regulator reaches its decisions internally. However, once the case team has consulted relevant government agencies and other third parties, the case handler will then prepare an internal report to:

- Summarise the information provided.
- Outline the reasons for approving (with or without conditions) or prohibiting the transaction for sign-off by the hierarchy.

Following this, the regulator issues an internal document consenting to the decision.

The regulator consults widely during its investigation, and may seek the opinion of other government agencies and interested third parties, including customers, suppliers and competitors as well as relevant trade associations. It may also conduct site visits and, in complex cases, it may hold public hearings inviting third parties to comment on the transaction. Increasingly, and in particular in complex cases, transactions are delayed as the regulator seeks comments from other government authorities.

Assessment criteria

The focus of the regulator’s investigation is to determine whether the notified transaction has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition in China. Unlike the terms “significant impediment to competition” or “substantial lessening of competition” used in the tests applicable in other major jurisdictions, there is no express requirement that the impact of the notified transaction on competition be significant or substantial under the 2007 AML.

On 29 August 2011, MOFCOM issued the Interim Provisions on Assessment of the Impact of Business Operator Concentration on Competition 2011 (2011 Interim Concentration Assessment Rules), that, together with the limited guidance provided in the regulator’s few published decisions, underscore some of the factors that the regulator takes into account during its review. In line with international practice, the regulator considers unilateral or co-ordinated effects when assessing horizontal mergers and evaluates foreclosure effects in the case of vertical or conglomerate mergers. The factors the regulator focuses on include:

- Market share, including the parties’ market position in the relevant market compared to competitors.
- The degree of market concentration in the relevant market with reference to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) or the combined market shares of the top N enterprises in the industry (CRn Index).
- The impact of the transaction on consumers and other third parties, including customers, suppliers and competitors.
- The impact of the transaction on potential competition.
- The impact of the transaction on market access and technological progress.
- The competitiveness of the market post-transaction.
- The impact of the transaction on national economic development.

The regulator also considers whether the concentration will generate efficiencies (such as economies of scale and scope, or cost reduction) and non-competition factors (such as social and public interest considerations) during its investigations (Articles 9 and 12, 2011 Interim Concentration Assessment Rules).

The regulator may block a transaction if it raises significant concerns. The regulator may also clear a transaction subject to remedies to reduce its perceived negative effects. The regulator must publish any decision prohibiting a concentration or approving a concentration subject to remedies (Article 30, 2007 AML). In 2012, the regulator started to publish a list of unconditional clearance decisions on a quarterly basis. Since Q2 of 2019, the regulator started to publish case lists on a weekly basis. This is a welcome development as it increases transparency in relation to the regulator’s merger review work.

The regulator’s decisions can be challenged through an administrative review procedure, followed by an administrative litigation procedure in the courts (Article 53, 2007 AML). There has been no such challenge to date.
REMEDIES

On 4 December 2014, MOFCOM issued the *Provisions of the Ministry of Commerce on Imposing Additional Restrictive Conditions on the Concentration of Business Operators (for Trial Implementation) 2014* (2014 MOFCOM Provisions on Restrictive Conditions for Concentrations). The rules highlight the regulator’s preference for structural remedies, namely asset or business disposals. These rules, Article 11 of the *2009 Concentration of Business Measures* and the regulator’s published decisions show that the regulator will also accept non-structural remedies (in certain circumstances) as an alternative remedy, such as:

- Access rights.
- Hold-separate obligations.
- License grants.
- Termination of exclusive agreements.
- Fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) or FRAND-type commitments.

Remedies may be offered and accepted during either review phase. The parties should put forward a final proposal of remedies within 20 days before the end date of the regulator’s phase II review. If, within the specified timeline, the parties fail to put forward the proposal or the proposal is insufficient to address the competition concerns, the regulator will make a decision to prohibit the concentration (*Article 6, 2014 MOFCOM Provisions on Restrictive Conditions for Concentrations*).

Where implementation of the parties’ preferred proposal may be uncertain, the regulator may request an alternative proposal, or crown jewel, with remedies which should not involve any uncertainties as to their implementation and should be more stringent than the first proposal (*Article 7, 2014 MOFCOM Provisions on Restrictive Conditions for Concentrations*).

Divestment

Where divestment is imposed as a remedy, the ultimate purchaser of the divested assets or business requires an approval from the regulator. The purchaser must:

- Be independent of the parties to the concentration.
- Possess the necessary skill, resources and intent to maintain and develop the acquired assets or business.
- Not pose substantive competition concerns or raise regulatory hurdles. (*Articles 10-11, 2014 MOFCOM Provisions on Restrictive Conditions for Concentrations*).

The undertaking with the obligation to divest its assets or business under the regulator’s decision has either a six-month deadline or a timeline as set out in the regulator’s decision to find a suitable purchaser and enter into the final binding agreements related to the disposal. The regulator may extend this deadline by a maximum of three months. The regulator normally requires parties to propose at least three candidates for the purchaser of the divested assets or business. (*Articles 12-13, 2014 MOFCOM Provisions on Restrictive Conditions for Concentrations*).

In addition, an up-front buyer may be required where:

- There exist material risks to maintain the competitiveness and marketability of the divested assets or business before the divestiture.
- The identity of the purchaser has decisive influence on the resumption of competitiveness of the divested assets or business.
- A third-party claims rights over the divested assets or business. (*Article 14, 2014 MOFCOM Provisions on Restrictive Conditions for Concentrations*).

There is no requirement that the up-front buyer be identified during the regulator’s review. It is sufficient that the parties agree not to close the transaction until a suitable purchaser is found.

The regulator normally requires parties to appoint a trustee (approved by the regulator) to monitor the parties’ compliance with the conditions imposed in the clearance decision (*Article 21, 2014 MOFCOM Provisions on Restrictive Conditions for Concentrations*). In practice, a monitoring trustee is appointed to monitor the sale of the divested assets or business during a period to be specified in the clearance decision, failing which the regulator...
may appoint a divestiture trustee to oversee a fire sale of the divested assets or business. A trustee may also be appointed to monitor compliance with non-structural remedies (Article 24, 2014 MOFCOM Provisions on Restrictive Conditions for Concentrations). The regulator normally requires the parties to propose at least three candidates for a trustee (Article 12, 2014 MOFCOM Provisions on Restrictive Conditions for Concentrations).

**Amendment or release of remedies**

The parties can apply to the regulator for the amendment or release of the remedies when there is any material change to the circumstances on which the remedies are based (Article 26, 2014 MOFCOM Provisions on Restrictive Conditions for Concentrations). For example:

- On 9 January 2015, the regulator issued its first public decision releasing part of Google’s obligations under the regulator’s Google/Motorola decision upon Google’s request.
- On 19 October 2015, the regulator approved the partial removal of remedies imposed on the merger between Western Digital and HGST, which was conditionally approved in 2012, and Seagate Technology’s acquisition of the hard disk drive business of Samsung Electronics, conditionally approved in 2011.
- On 8 June 2016, the regulator announced its decision to remove the conditions imposed in relation to Walmart’s acquisition in 2012 of a 33.6% shareholding in Newheight, which indirectly owned Yihaodian (a Chinese e-commerce company).
- On 1 February 2018, the regulator announced its decision to remove the conditions imposed on the establishment of joint venture between Henkel Hong Kong and Tiande Chemical, conditionally approved in 2012.
- On 9 February 2018, the regulator decided to remove the remedies imposed in relation to MediaTek’s acquisition of MStar Semiconductor, which was conditionally approved in 2013.
- On 22 August 2018, the regulator decided to remove the remedies imposed in relation to the establishment of joint venture between GE China and China Shenhua, conditionally approved in 2011.

If the parties fail to comply with the conditions to clearance imposed by the regulator or violate the 2014 MOFCOM Provisions on Restrictive Conditions for Concentrations, they may be subject to the same legal liabilities as for failure to notify the transaction. The regulator may also require the parties to re-file their transaction.

**Notable cases with remedies**

The regulator has wide discretion in determining the appropriate remedies in cases.

**Divestiture of assets or business**

In Pfizer/Wyeth, Panasonic/Sanyo, Alpha V/Savio, UTC/Goodrich, Glencore/Xstrata, Baxter/Gambo, Thermo Fisher/Life Technologies, NXP/Freescale, Abbott/St. Jude, Dow/Du Pont, BD/Bard, Bayer/Monsanto and UTC/Rockwell Collins, the regulator imposed structural remedies requiring the divestment of certain assets as a condition to clear the transaction. In Panasonic/Sanyo, the divestment included an overseas manufacturing facility in line with commitments made elsewhere.

Similarly, in Glencore/Xstrata, Glencore was required to divest an overseas project to address competition concerns in China. Both in BD/Bard and Bayer/Monsanto, the regulator required the parties to divest the concerned global-wide business for the clearance in China.

In BD/Bard, the divestment included BD’s R&D projects which would challenge Bard’s leading market position.

In Pfizer/Wyeth, UTC/Goodrich, NXP/Freescale and Abbott/St. Jude, parties were further required to provide technical assistance to the purchaser of the divested business within certain periods.

In UTC/Rockwell Collins (RC), the divestment included RC’s global-wide businesses of Trimmable Horizontal Stabiliser Actuator, Pilot Control System and SMR Technology and UTC’s global-wide R&D projects of Oxygen System.

**Divestiture of production capacity or shareholdings in other companies**

In Mitsubishi/Lucite, the regulator required the parties to off-load production capacity to a third party for five years.

In Alpha V/Savio, the divestment related to the disposal of a non-controlling minority interest in a portfolio company that overlapped with the acquired business.

In Thermo Fisher/Life Technologies, in addition to the divestment of certain assets in line with commitments made elsewhere, Thermo Fisher was also required to divest a controlling majority interest in a company in China.

In Panasonic/Sanyo, Panasonic was required to reduce its equity interest in a joint venture from 40% to 19.5%.
In AB-InBev/SAB Miller, SAB Miller was required to divest its 49% equity in CR Snow.

In Agrrium/PotashCorp, PotashCorp was required to divest its minority shareholdings in various companies.

In Linde/Praxair, Linde was required to divest helium assets with a total annual production volume of 90 million standard cubic meters and divest its stakes in four joint ventures in Guangdong, China.

**Hold-separate obligations**

In the Seagate/Samsung, Western Digital/HCST, Marubeni/Cavilon, MediaTek/MStar, Advanced Semiconductor/Siliconware Precision and Cargotec/TTS transactions, the regulator imposed hold-separate obligations that allowed the parties to proceed with the transaction, but froze integration for a specified period. The conditions in these cases are far-reaching and leave the regulator discretion to postpone integration further if deemed necessary.

**FRAND commitment**

In KLA-Tencor/Orbotech, KLA-Tencor committed to make available process control equipment and related services to deposition and/or etch equipment manufacturers in the Chinese market on FRAND terms.

In the GM/Delphi, Henkel/Tiande, Google/Motorola, Microsoft/Nokia, Merck/AZ Electronic, Corun/Toyota China/PEVE/Xin Zhong Yuan/Toyota Tsusho, Nokia/Alcatel-Lucent, Advanced Semiconductor/Siliconware Precision, Bayer/Monsanto and Essilor/Luxottica transactions, the regulator imposed a FRAND commitment.

In Google/Motorola, a FRAND commitment was imposed alongside commitments not to discriminate against certain original equipment manufacturers.

In Merck/AZ Electronic, Merck committed that when it licenses a patent, it will license its patent based on non-exclusive and non-sub-licensable terms.

In Nokia/Alcatel-Lucent, a FRAND commitment was imposed alongside commitments to keep Chinese licensees and companies informed of transfers of standard essential patents (SEPs) to third parties.

In Bayer/Monsanto, a FRAND commitment was imposed together with the divestment requirements.

In Essilor/Luxottica, the regulator required the parties to provide all glass frames and sunglasses within the brand portfolio of the merged entity and to license relevant trademarks to Chinese optical shops on FRAND terms.

**Access to infrastructure or technology**

In Panasonic/Sanyo, the regulator required the parties to grant license to use their intellectual property (IP) rights related to the divested business at the request of the purchaser of the divested business.

In ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/Gemalto, in line with remedies imposed elsewhere, the regulator required ARM to disclose information related to its TrustZone technology that is necessary to develop alternative trusted execution environment (TEE) solutions for consumer electronic devices. The regulator required the information to be provided on the same terms as ARM provides it to the joint venture. These remedies will remain in force for eight years and, as a result, cover the release of ARM’s next generation IP architecture.

In Broadcom/Brocade, the regulator required Broadcom to ensure that interoperability between its own switch products and third-party adapters will not be lower than that between its own switch and adapter products.

**Prohibition or restriction on parties’ future activities**

In InBev/Anheuser-Busch, the regulator imposed a range of conditions on the merged entity’s future investment in China and a requirement to obtain the regulator’s approval for a broad range of transactions.

In Mitsubishi/Lucite, the parties were not allowed to acquire competitors or open new manufacturing sites for certain products for five years.

Similarly, in MediaTek/MStar, the parties were not allowed to acquire any other competitors in the LCD TV chip market without the regulator’s approval.

In Novartis/Alcon, the regulator required Novartis not to supply its competing product to the Chinese market in a particular market for a period of five years even though it had already taken the strategic decision to exit that market.

In the Wal-Mart/Newheight case, the regulator imposed conditions geared at prohibiting Wal-Mart’s involvement in value-added telecoms services. The transaction resulted in Wal-Mart acquiring a controlling stake in the holding company of the largest online supermarket in China and a provider of value-added telecoms services.

In HP/Samsung, the parties were not allowed to acquire any shares of any printer maker’s A4 laser printer business in China, or to engage in conduct such as technical measures or upgrades for their A4 laser printers and related materials sold in China that could affect the compatibility of third-party materials.
In *Agrium/PotashCorp*, the parties were not allowed to acquire any shares of any competitors in the potash market within five years. Furthermore, the parties were required to turn PotashCorp's equity in a certain Chinese company (Restricted Company) into a restrained investment interest. Restrictions on the parties included having no PotashCorp employees in the Restricted Company's management, no appointees or influence on the Restricted Company’s board of directors, and to not seek ways to obtain competition-sensitive information related to China’s potash import market.

In *Maersk/Hamburg Süd*, the parties were not allowed to enter into vessel sharing agreements with major rivals or join a shipping alliance in certain shipping routes within five years after the completion of the proposed transaction.

In *Advanced Semiconductor/Siliconware Precision*, the parties committed not to prohibit their customers from choosing other suppliers and to assist their customers in switching suppliers.

In *UTC/Rockwell Collins*, the parties committed not to materially change the business model.

In *Cargotec/TTS*, Cargotec was required not to raise the prices of the relevant products in China market for five years.

**Supply of products or services**

In *Thermo Fisher/Life Technologies*, the regulator imposed behavioural remedies, requiring Thermo Fisher, for the subsequent ten years, to commit to certain designated supply arrangements for certain products at the option of the relevant third parties.

In *Corun/Toyota China/PEVE/Xin Zhong Yuan/Toyota Tsusho*, the regulator required the joint venture to generate sales within the first three years of operation, if there is relevant market demand.

In *Dow/Du Pont*, the parties were required to supply certain ingredients and formulations to any voluntary Chinese third-party purchaser on a non-exclusive basis at a reasonable price within five years following the completion of the proposed transaction.

In *Agrium/PotashCorp*, the regulator required the parties to ensure that Canpotex remains a stable and reliable potash exporter to China on a competitive basis and promote Canpotex's exports to China at an amount equivalent to or higher than the average amount in the past five years on the precondition that terms and conditions are negotiated.

In *Essilor/Luxottica*, the regulator required the parties to provide to the Chinese optical shops with the STARS plans after receiving the regulator’s approval. It was also specified in the remedies that in any circumstances, the Chinese optical shops must have the discretion to choose to order glass frames and sunglasses via the merged entity's wholesale system.

**Maintenance of specified trading terms or sales practices**

In *GM/Delphi*, the regulator imposed various behavioural remedies, including conditions requiring the merged entity to maintain existing market practice and to guarantee existing levels of supply and services.

In *GE/Shenhua and Henkel/Tianhe*, the regulator imposed behavioural remedies designed to maintain the market structure pre-merger and to guarantee existing levels of supply before the transaction.

Similarly, in the *Uralkali/Silvinit* transaction and *Glencore/Xstrata*, the regulator required the parties to maintain existing terms and conditions of trade, including with respect to contract and price negotiations, and to use best efforts to maintain current levels of supply of the relevant products.

In *Seagate/Samsung* and *Western Digital/HGST*, the regulator required the parties to maintain the existing business model.

In *Google/Motorola*, Google was required to maintain its current business practice to license the Android Platform on a free and open source basis for five years. The regulator reserved the right to review market conditions, after five years, with a view to adopting a further decision.

In *Broadcom/Brocade*, the regulator required Broadcom to continue offering the existing terms for its switch products.

In *HP/Samsung*, the regulator required HP to continue to sell A4 laser printer products on fair and reasonable supply conditions.

In *Agrium/PotashCorp*, the regulator required the parties to retain Canpotex’s present selling methods and procedures.
In Linde/Praxair, the regulator required the parties to continue supplying the Chinese market with inert rare gas, fluorine-containing rare gas, and hydrogen chloride rare gas mixtures at reasonable prices and volumes in a timely and stable manner.

In UTC/Rockwell Collins, parties are required to continuously perform the existing contracts and organizations under existing terms unless the contracting parties otherwise agree.

Termination of agreements

In the Novartis/Alcon transaction, Novartis was required to terminate an existing distribution agreement within 12 months of the regulator’s decision.

In Baxter/Cambro, Baxter was required to terminate an existing OEM agreement with a company in China by 31 March 2016.

In Maersk/Hamburg Süd, Hamburg Süd was required not to extend the vessel sharing agreement on one shipping route after its expiration, and to withdraw the vessel sharing agreement in another shipping route.

Undertaking to decrease price

In Thermo Fisher/Life Technologies, the regulator required Thermo Fisher, for the subsequent ten years, to decrease the list price in China for certain products by 1% per year and not to decrease the percentage discount from the list price available to distributors in China.

Undertaking to decrease market share

In Maersk/Hamburg Süd, the regulator required Maersk to reduce its market share by capacity in the refrigerated container shipping business on one shipping route to a specified level (34-39%), and maintain the market share by capacity below the specified level within three years after the completion of the transaction.

Undertaking not to engage in unlawful activities

In GM/Delphi, the regulator requirements for the merged entity included not to:

- Discriminate against upstream or downstream domestic customers.
- Obtain confidential information unlawfully on other domestic upstream suppliers.
- Disclose competitively sensitive information to third parties.

In GE/Shenhua, the regulator required Shenhua not to force any party to use the joint venture’s technology by limiting or restricting the supply of the raw coal.

In Seagate/Samsung and Western Digital/HGST, the regulator required the parties not to force existing customers to purchase products exclusively from the parties.

In ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/Gemalto, ARM undertook not to design its IP in a manner that would degrade the performance of competitors’ TEEs.

In Merck/AZ Electronic, the regulator required Merck not to engage in any type of tie-in practice that would force, directly or indirectly, its customers located in China to purchase Merck’s and AZ’s products simultaneously, including through any cross-subsidisation between Merck’s and AZ’s products.

In Dow/Du Pont, the regulator required the parties not to request Chinese distributors to sell certain products on exclusive basis within five years following the completion of the proposed transaction.

In Broadcom/Brocade, the regulator required Broadcom not to discriminate against third-party fibre channel adapters and not to engage in any form of tie-in or bundled sales.

In HP/Samsung, the regulator required HP not to carry out false or misleading advertising or marketing for Chinese potential customers. Furthermore, the regulator required the parties not to carry out tie-in sales for A4 laser printer products or other unreasonable business practices.

In Essilor/Luxottica, the regulator required the parties not to engage in any type of tie-in practice on eyeglass products, including but not limited to, not refusing to separately provide to the Chinese optical shops with spectacle lens, glass frames, sunglasses, and not imposing unreasonable trading conditions. The remedies also require the parties to commit that they should not impose any exclusivity conditions on the Chinese optical shops to foreclose or limit the sale of the competitors’ eyeglass products. The parties were further required not to sell any eyeglass products at price below cost.

In UTC/Rockwell Collins, the parties committed not to engage in any tie-in sales or impose unfair trading conditions in the provision of certain relevant products.
In KLA-Tencor/Orbotech, KLA-Tencor committed not to conduct tie-in sales of process control equipment and deposition and/or etch equipment supplied to the Chinese market when not justified or impose other unreasonable trading conditions. KLA-Tencor further committed that it will take measures to ensure that Orbotech will not obtain the competitively sensitive information of the deposition and/or etch equipment manufacturers in the Chinese market.

In Cargotec/TTS, Cargotec was required by the regulator not to refuse or restrict the supply of hatch covers, roll-on equipment for merchant ships, and cargo lifters to Chinese customers, or maliciously delay the supply of the products without justifiable reasons within five years.

**WHAT MUST BE SUBMITTED WITH THE NOTIFICATION?**

The regulator has provided some guidance on the information required for a notification to be complete (2009 Guiding Opinions on Documents for Concentration of Business Operators and 2018 Notification Form). It may be possible to scope the information required during pre-consultation discussions with the regulator (see Pre-consultation phase). The more information that is omitted, the more likely it is that the start of the formal review process may be delayed.

The same level of detail and information is required for transactions that have no substantive competition concerns. For cases that qualify as simple cases under the 2014 Interim Simple Mergers Regulations, a simplified notification form is available.

The main information and documents that are usually required are:

- Details of the parties to the transaction, including domicile and business scope and the parties' turnover in the preceding financial year.
- A power of attorney if the notifying party is represented by external counsel.
- Identification (or incorporation) certificate of the notifying party, and a copy of a notarised and legalised certificate of incorporation for foreign parties to the transaction.
- Information about the parties' activities and that of their affiliates, the relevant industry and products involved, the list of names of affiliated undertakings and individuals, and a description of the transaction itself (including the economic rationale for the transaction).
- The certificate of approval and business license of the relevant undertakings, representative offices, branches and other registered entities established by each party in China.
- Internal analyses and reports prepared by the parties to the transaction (such as board documents), or prepared by third parties.
- A reasoned definition of the relevant product market and geographic market, including the turnover and market share of each party in the relevant market in China and globally for the last two financial years.
- An analysis of the degree of competition in the relevant market as well as detailed information about that market, including the names, contact details and market share for the last two financial years of the main competitors, as well as information on the parties' main customers and suppliers, and information about relevant trade associations.
- An analysis of the impact of the transaction on the development of the domestic market post-merger, including a business plan specific to China if available.
- A copy of the transaction agreement(s) together with a Chinese translation or summary of the transaction agreement(s).
- The audited financial statements for the last financial year of the parties together with a summary in Chinese of the audited accounts.
- Confirmation that the transaction (and the parties' businesses in China generally) satisfy applicable laws in China such as in relation to required foreign investment approvals and industrial policy requirements.
- A statement regarding the accuracy and authenticity of the information contained in the notification and its source.

The regulator has discretion to require further information. The regulator may also require information on the markets where the parties do not overlap. In general, the level of detail required for non-overlap markets depends on the circumstances of the case.
ARE THERE SPECIAL RULES IN CHINA’S FREE TRADE ZONES?

The State Council has approved the establishment of free trade zones (FTZ) in 12 provinces and province-level municipalities. Some of the FTZs have adopted special rules to implement the 2007 AML. For example, the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (Shanghai FTZ) issued the Measures of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone for the Anti-monopoly Review of the Concentration of Business Operators 2014 (2014 Shanghai FTZ Merger Review Measures). (For more information on the key reforms in the Shanghai FTZ, see Practice note, China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone.)

Generally speaking, the implementation rules adopted in the FTZs have not changed the merger control regime in China. The SAMR is still the only authority to conduct merger reviews. Authorities in the FTZs are only provided with some auxiliary responsibilities to assist or co-operate with the SAMR to administer the merger control regime. For example, the SAMR can authorise its branch in the Shanghai FTZ to:

- Identify notifiable transactions.
- Collect information or evidence.
- Assist with the SAMR’s investigation.
- Supervise the implementation of remedies imposed by the SAMR.

(Article 3, 2014 Shanghai FTZ Merger Review Measures.)

- Although the implementation rules adopted in the FTZs have not changed the merger control regime in China, authorities in the FTZs can still play an important role in implementing the regime in several aspects, for example:
  - Authorities in the FTZs know well the undertakings operating in, and transactions conducted in, the FTZs and can actively identify and report to the SAMR the undertakings that:
    - fail to notify their transactions;
    - fail to implement remedies imposed by the SAMR; or
    - violate the 2007 AML or its implementation rules in other ways.
- Authorities in the FTZs can also be well-positioned to provide opinions on the status of, or impact on, competition within the FTZs during the process of the SAMR’s review.

Therefore, undertakings operating in the FTZs may face a certain level of scrutiny from the authorities in the FTZs.

CONFIDENTIALITY

The regulator’s officials are required by the 2007 AML to keep the business secrets of parties confidential.

A party wishing to keep information contained in the notification from being published or otherwise disclosed must redact the relevant document or content, and provide reasons for the confidentiality claim. The final decision as to whether information can be regarded as confidential rests with the regulator.

Parties must submit a non-confidential version of the notification and related annexes, together with the confidential version. The regulator may send the non-confidential version to third parties, including government agencies, trade associations, competitors, suppliers or customers.

NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW

Article 31 of the 2007 AML requires the parties to undergo a separate national security review (NSR) process where a foreign investor participates in the concentration of undertakings by acquiring a domestic Chinese company (or through other means) and the transaction has a national security concern. However, the 2007 AML does not provide any operative mechanism on how to conduct an NSR process.

Since 2011, China has established and progressively increased the severity of an NSR process for foreign investments. Under the NSR regime, a joint-ministerial committee chaired by MOFCOM and the NDRC under the leadership of the State Council will review a foreign acquisition in the context of its impact on areas such as:

- National defence.
- Steady running of the national economy and general order of society.
Research and development capacity for key technologies related to the national security.
The joint committee may have wide discretion to scrutinise and restrict the transaction in China.

On 15 March 2019, the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed the **Foreign Investment Law 2019** (2019 FIL), which will come into force on 1 January 2020. The law generally mentions the establishment of an NSR regime without any further details.

(For full coverage of the 2019 FIL, see *Legal update, China enacts unified Foreign Investment Law.*)

For more information on China’s current NSR regime, see *Practice note, National security review in China: overview.*

**ANNEX 1: INDICATIVE TIMELINE OF THE MERGER CONTROL PROCESS**

The following table outlines the regulator’s published decisions. It does not reflect pre-consultation discussions that parties may have had with the regulator before the notification date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Prohibition/conditional clearance</th>
<th>Notification date</th>
<th>Start of review</th>
<th>Decision date</th>
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<td>Behavioural</td>
<td>31 December 2013</td>
<td>4 March 2014</td>
<td>2 July 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nokia/Alcatel-Lucent</td>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>21 April 2015</td>
<td>15 June 2015</td>
<td>19 October 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>AB-InBev/ SAB Miller</td>
<td>Structural/behavioural</td>
<td>8 March 2016</td>
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<td>Broadcom/Brocade</td>
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<td>13 January 2017</td>
<td>6 May 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>HP/Samsung</td>
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<td>16 November 2016</td>
<td>Re-started on 17 November 2016</td>
<td>22 August 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrium/PotashCorp</td>
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<td>23 December 2016</td>
<td>5 October 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maersk/Hamburg Süd</td>
<td>Behavioural</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advanced Semiconductor/Siliconware Precision</td>
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<td>25 August 2016</td>
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<td>BD/Bard</td>
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<td>KLA-Tencor/Orbotech</td>
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</table>

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